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Abstract  
This chapter presents the findings of a study of the chairs and CEOs of large UK listed 
companies, exploring the chair’s role in harnessing the capabilities of the board in order to deal 
with strategic tensions. The study draws on 30 in-depth exploratory interviews with chairs and 
CEOs and finds that chairs have a wide range of choices at their disposal in pursuit of the 
surfacing and handling of strategic tensions by the board. These choices include setting the 
tone, the policy and practice of engagement between non-executives and the business, and 
between the board and the CEO. It is essential for the chair to take a proactive approach and 
ensure that tension-generating topics are part of the agenda and that all board members, formal 
or not, are encouraged to attend committee work. Engagement is insufficient if it is not 
followed by appropriate debate. Chairs manage board dynamics and participants’ contributions 
during meetings, ensuring, by means of regular summarising and concluding, that tensions are 
confronted and discussed by all members and that a shared direction is agreed. Through such 
practice, chairs establish the degree of board involvement in strategy, aiming for an 
involvement that is both challenging and supportive of the executive and which is best 
described as interactive strategising. Boards of directors regularly face difficult, strategic-
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tension-generating issues, and this study offers fresh insight into the chair’s critical role as 
leader. 
 
Keywords: Chairperson; Strategic Tensions; Board Engagement; Board Debate.  
1. Introduction 
The chairperson role is often described by regulators and academics alike as a non-executive 
one, charged with leading the board of directors in the pursuit of their legal and regulatory 
duties, as well as inducing good performance from the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the 
executive team. This, however, varies according to the country and corresponding regulatory 
environment. In the US Standard & Poor’s 500, for example, chairperson and CEO roles are 
held separate in 51 percent of companies, but only 28 percent of chairpersons are truly 
independent (Spencer Stuart, 2017a), whereas in the UK role separation has been embraced by 
about 99.3 percent of FTSE 350 companies (Spencer Stuart, 2017b). The old adage that a board 
is only as good as its next chairperson is in fact becoming increasingly more accurate, since 
the role has become greater in respect to both time and responsibility (Boyden, 2014). In fact, 
the “return of the chairman” has been heralded for quite some time now (Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2007a). Recent studies in the US context indicate that the incumbent of the chair 
accounts for 9 percent of variation in firm performance, which exceeds the percentage 
attributed to the CEO, especially when environments are characterised by complexity and 
resource scarcity (Withers and Fitza, 2017). In this chapter complexity and resource scarcity is 
typical during recessions, financial crisis, or significant technology disruptions to the business 
model of the incumbent. It is the purpose of the chair to harness board members’ diverse skills, 
experience and associations, and encourage challenging debate, all the while ensuring the board 
remains cohesive (Cadbury, 1992; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007b; Taylor, 2001). However, 
in times of complexity and resource scarcity, the reality is that a number of strategic tensions 
will arise that can threaten the preservation of a collective and shared view of how the firm is 
managed and governed. 
In this study, strategic tensions are broadly defined as firm-level competing demands that 
are handled at the highest levels of organisations and have strategic consequences for the 
organisation as a whole. Strategic tensions confront and are handled by top officers on a 
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continual basis – this could be described as the essence of their role (Morais, Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2018). From the board’s perspective, strategic tensions threaten to disrupt the 
relationship between non-executives and executives and can cause rifts within the board. 
Strategic tensions may include, for example, divergences between board members around 
strategic direction, competitive advantage, or the relative balance between restructuring and 
growing the business (Morais, 2017). The role of the chair is hence critical in setting the tone 
for, and practice of, engagement, in maintaining a balance between challenging and supportive 
debate, and in ensuring the board as whole remains united around a shared strategy and vision. 
This chapter draws on in-depth interviews with 30 chairs and CEOs of some of the largest 
UK listed companies, undertaken during a period in which the companies were undergoing 
restructuring, or experiencing a turnaround, reputational problems or other forms of corporate 
trauma – situations that disrupted governance and strategy arrangements and generated 
strategic tensions regarding the firm’s future direction. The findings place the chair of the board 
in the critical seat in ensuring that strategic tensions are handled well through adequate 
engagement and effective board discussion practices.  
The chapter is organised as follows. It starts with a brief review of the literature regarding 
the chairperson role in the UK context, followed by an outline of the study methodology. It 
then presents the findings derived from a thematic analysis of the interview material. The 
findings are illustrated with quotes and examples from study participants. The chapter closes 
with implications for the board’s role as regards strategy, and a conclusion. 
2. The chairperson as leader of the board: a review of the literature 
The UK has a tradition of a one-tier unitary board composed of a mix of executives and a 
majority of non-executives, separate chairperson and CEO positions and mandatory audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees staffed with a majority or even a totality of non-
executive, independent directors (Financial Reporting Council, 2016).  
The UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2016) emphasises the 
importance of the effective leadership of the board of directors by the chairperson. This is 
undertaken by ensuring that agenda items reflect the totality of non-executive director (NED) 
concerns, that time allocated to discussion is sufficient, and that management proposals are 
aired openly, sufficiently addressed and constructively challenged. It is also the chairperson’s 
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duty to ensure that NEDs receive adequate, independent and timely information both from 
internal and external sources that they are sufficiently engaged with the business, and that board 
members’ induction, evaluation and development is carried out effectively (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2016). 
A number of leadership studies have been undertaken to precisely determine the 
chairperson’s role and to identify the leadership traits and competencies required (Kakabadse 
et al., 2001; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2008; Roberts, 2002). Some studies assert that 
effective boardroom dynamics can be achieved through chairpersons’ social and political skills 
in managing often sensitive relationships and individual egos, and by their being able to 
mitigate and avoid interpersonal collision in a complex and subtle way (Kakabadse et al., 
2001). Ultimately, the chairperson’s job is to manage processes of accountability (Roberts, 
2002; Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005), described as “processes of learning, which 
acknowledge the inevitable incompleteness of individual thought, and through which strategy 
emerges as the synergistic outcome of board discussion” (Roberts, 2002:515). The chairperson 
needs to create “positive dynamics of accountability” by supporting a culture of challenge and 
support, setting the behavioural standards expected and managing the agenda and information 
flows in ways that facilitate NED involvement and contribution while retaining independence 
of mind. Hence, the chairperson plays an important role in ensuring quality of debate so that 
“the interplay of different skills and perspectives amongst different members of the board can 
itself produce new perspectives that offer creative solutions to particular dilemmas” (Roberts, 
McNulty and Stiles, 2005:S16). 
Recognising the importance of board leadership, Kakabadse et al. (2001) conducted one 
of the first in-depth interview studies of UK FTSE 100 company directors. It was found that a 
high-performing chairperson exhibited maturity, relational skills, high political and social 
competence, meetings skills and coaching capabilities, all of use in managing boardroom 
dynamics, with boardroom politics and social dimensions being key. Leblanc and Gillies 
(2005) go as far as to view the leadership qualities of the chair (and its relationship with the 
CEO) as the single most important factor impacting board effectiveness. It has been proposed 
that the three most important tasks of the chairperson are i) assessment of, and relationship 
with, the CEO; ii) preventing board denial; and iii) dealing with non-performing directors 
(Leblanc and Gillies, 2005). 
Other research shows that the chair plays an essential role in reconciling conflicting 
agendas. Acknowledging and valuing differences, yet finding underlying complementarities, 
common views and causes, is at the heart of chairperson leadership as well as boardroom 
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effectiveness (e.g. Dulewicz, Gay and Taylor, 2007; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007b; 
Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Knyght, 2010; Roberts, 2002). Other studies, such as the one by 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2008), identify six disciplines that a world-class chairperson needs 
to master in order to lead for boardroom effectiveness: i) delineating boundaries (between 
chairperson and CEO roles, distinct from board and management roles); ii) sense-making 
(concerning the mission, vision and values in the boardroom and the organisation); iii) 
interrogating the argument (questioning policy and strategy); iv) influencing outcomes 
(through building shared objectives and alignment); v) living the values (based on trust and 
integrity and paying attention to the imbalances between espoused values and practised values); 
and vi) developing the board (which includes board evaluation, selection, development, 
coaching, etc.) (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2008). Yet chairpersons’ leadership behaviours 
and styles vary according to board and corporate context. For example, Levrau and Van den 
Berghe (2013) interviewed company secretaries from 39 large companies in the Belgium Stock 
Exchange large-capitalisation (BEL 20) and medium-capitalisation companies (BEL MID) (33 
of which had separate chairperson and CEO roles), and found that chairpersons exhibited 
highly heterogeneous leadership styles which impacted on the quality of the decisions made 
and on the group’s commitment to those decisions. It is argued that the chairperson should be 
able to transform the boardroom into an effective collective decision-making body, by 
removing “negative group dynamics” (Levrau and Van den Berghe, 2013). This requires a 
chairperson to have particular specific personal competencies and attributes that go beyond the 
structural aspects of board leadership, and which include creativity, criticality, preparedness 
and commitment (Levrau and Van den Berghe, 2013). 
There is a growing stream of literature focusing on the chairperson’s role, skills and 
contribution (Dulewicz, Gay and Taylor, 2007; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2008; Levrau and 
van den Berghe, 2013), and viewing the relationship between the chair and CEO (Kakabadse, 
Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006; Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Knyght, 2010; Roberts, 2002) as 
central to board effectiveness. This literature converges on the idea that the chairperson is a 
“bridge”, playing a role in balancing different interests, skills and perspectives inside and 
around the boardroom: the crucial person who is charged with transforming the board into an 
effective collective decision-making group (Levrau and Van den Berghe, 2013) or a high-
performing team (Gabrielson, Huse and Minichilli, 2007). Strategic tensions are likely to 
emerge from the confrontation of these different interests, skills and perspectives, especially in 
uncertain, complex and resource-constrained environments; but how the chairperson 
systematically handles strategic tensions remains relatively under-explored.  
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3. The study  
The findings and insights contained in this chapter have emerged from a thematic analysis of 
30 in-depth interviews with highly experienced chairs and CEOs of UK large listed companies, 
across 18 sectors. The number of individuals per sector is shown in the table 1, below.  
 
Table 1: Sample by industry  
Sectors  Interviews  
Manufacturing  4 
Retail  3 
Printing & publishing 3 
Travel & leisure  3 
Oil & gas  2 
High-tech 2 
Construction 2 
Broadcasting 2 
Pharma  1 
Telecom 1 
Infrastructure 1 
Defense & aerospace  1 
Energy  1 
Entertainment  1 
Banking 1 
Insurance  1 
Consulting  1 
Total 30 
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In total, 14 chairpersons and 16 CEOs were interviewed. There were 27 individuals from a 
White British background and three from “Other White” background; 29 were male and one 
female. The lack of female representation partly reflects the gender imbalance particularly 
noticeable in FTSE 100 top positions. In 2014–15, when the study was carried out, there were 
only three female chairs and five female CEOs in the FTSE 100 (Davies, 2015). The average 
age was 58, with chairpersons being, on average, older (61.7 years) than CEOs (56 years). 
Interviews were conducted in London between July 2014 and October 2015. Participants were 
initially selected via a consultancy firm based in London and there was an element of THE 
snowballing technique used for sampling. The criteria for selecting initial participants is based 
on them having significant experience as CEO and/or chairperson of FTSE100 companies 
during periods of significant complexity and resource scarcity (i.e. recessions, financial crisis, 
technology shifts disrupting the business).  Despite having reached data saturation by the 20th 
interview (i.e. the point at which no new data emerges that modifies existing categories) 
(Francis et. al., 2010), we continued with a further 10 interviews to strengthen the results as 
well as to benefit from the unique access to FTSE board directors.  
The participants were asked to discuss the role that chairpersons play during periods of 
significant disruption to the company (i.e. companies in turnaround and restructuring mode, or 
facing a severe reputational problem), where strategic tensions were likely to surface and 
require handling by the chair of the board.  
This exploratory and inductive study (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009) aimed to 
investigate how chairpersons respond to strategic tensions and to understand the demands, 
constraints and choices that chairs face in such situations. The interview material was separated 
by role type (CEO and chair), and further delineated according to how respondents evaluated 
the role of the chair and how effectively, according to the respondent, strategic tensions in the 
boardroom were handled by the chair. The analysis followed an inductive logic where 
interview material was coded to progressively form higher-level codes which were aggregated 
into themes and sub-themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Patton, 2002). The thematic analysis 
included six broad phases: i) immersion in the data (including transcribing, and reading 
verbatim); ii) generating initial coding; iii) searching for themes (i.e. how different codes 
combine to form a theme); iv) refining the themes (ensuring consistency within and across 
themes); v) defining and naming the themes; and vi) producing an analytical report of the 
analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  
To provide consistency within the coding procedure across the interviews, as well as to 
allow comparability, the authors used the Demands–Constraints–Choices (DCC) theory of role 
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(Stewart, 1982, 1991) which provided a framework from which to depart as well as code for 
the chairperson role. The DCC model posits that managers’ available choices or opportunities 
within the role are dynamically influenced by role demands (i.e. what is expected of any 
incumbent in terms of task and output in order to stay in the job) and internal and external 
constraints, which can be personal (e.g. own preferences) or organisational (e.g. reward 
systems, training), or they can be of physical (e.g. resources) or social and cultural natures (e.g. 
legal norms, peer attitudes, leadership) (Stewart, 1982, 2003). The nature of demands and 
constraints is situational, so the available behavioural choices adapt accordingly (Stewart, 
2003). Choices are enacted in three domains: i) aspects of the role to which the incumbent 
chooses to devote more time and commitment of resources; ii) the tasks that are delegated; iii) 
boundary management (Stewart, 1982). The DCC model is consistent with observations by 
Hales (1986), as it allows for variation and contingency, choice and negotiation, pressure and 
conflict, and reaction and non-reflection, stressing that managerial (and directors’) activities 
“may be competing, even contradictory” (Hales, 1986:102). What is more, role theory, and 
particularly the work of Rosemary Stewart, has been widely recognised for its contribution to 
qualitative methodologies (Parry, 2003), often seen as “exemplars of the argument for 
qualitative reasoning rather than quantitative analysis for studying a complex and weakly 
understood phenomena” (Kroeck, 2003:204). The use of this model for qualitative inquiry has 
been successfully used in past similar studies (e.g. Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007a; Morais, 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2018; Stewart, 1991). The next section presents the findings of the 
study. 
4. Study findings  
The analysis of the role of the chair in handling strategic tensions in the boardroom has shown 
that high-performing chairs ensure that strategic tensions are proactively surfaced and handled 
through appropriate engagement and debate. Two key themes emerged as critical chair 
practices in support of the effective handling of strategic tensions: i) Establishing and 
developing both a policy and practice of board engagement; and ii) Managing board debate, 
dynamics and contributions on tension-generating topics. These themes are broken down into 
a number of sub-themes which are explored and discussed in the rest of the chapter.  
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4.1 Establishing and developing both a policy and practice of board engagement 
A key demand of the chairperson role is to ensure an adequate level of board engagement with 
the business and with the CEO. Such practice lays the foundation for effective surfacing and 
handling of strategic tensions within the boardroom. This theme includes a variety of practices, 
namely: i) setting the expectations and practices of NED engagement with the business by 
requiring them to visit operations, talk to people at different levels within the company and 
attend specific events; ii) setting the tone for CEO–board engagement by establishing a process 
where potentially controversial strategic issues are discussed well in advance of a decision 
being required, and hence establishing a culture of supportive engagement between the board 
and CEO; and iii) setting the board agenda and working for engagement; this entails getting 
tension-generating topics onto the agenda and managing committee work and information 
flows. 
4.1.1 Non-executive directors’ engagement with the business 
Chairpersons have responsibility for imposing and encouraging the level of NED engagement. 
High NED engagement is perceived by chairpersons as an indication of NEDs’ knowledge of 
the company and its challenges, and hence renders them better equipped to discharge their 
duties of challenging and advising management. One chairperson explained his approach: 
… and the board members have total carte blanche to go wherever they like in the 
company. They can go into executive meetings, R&D research, product marketing, 
the management meeting that the CEO chairs, visit any research establishment, 
any manufacturing or commercial unit, find out what’s going on, ask questions, be 
better informed and hopefully more able to add value when it came to looking at 
the issues and challenges. No chaperoning – and initially I said, “Go and be a fly 
on the wall, but if you need to ask a question, ask a question”, and that is now part 
of the way the company operates. And I always had that right, if you like, but I 
wanted to make sure all my board members did. (Chairperson 3) 
The chairperson of a large retailer explained his approach of ensuring that non-executive 
board members are close to the business and connected with the business reality: 
We actually have quite a few breakfasts where non-executives come in here and 
talk to people of all levels in the business, because we really want people to 
understand what the board does. And I think it always surprises people in the 
business how in touch the board is with day-to-day life here, because normally you 
would think this is some remote thing that you never see. But actually I think almost 
all of our non-execs have been in and done these employee breakfasts and I think 
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that’s really valuable. And I do a number of them as well and they can get a sense 
of “should I trust these people to both hold to account and challenge?” but also 
encourage the executive team, because I think they expect that from a board. 
(Chairperson 4) 
Studies in UK and US contexts have identified that effective chairpersons ensure that 
these engagement practices are part of their board culture. Facilitating NEDs’ independent 
access to sources of information (e.g. by visiting operations, directing questions to lower levels 
of management, and accessing company documents) has been identified as an effective 
chairperson practice contributing to NED role fulfilment as regards monitoring and advising 
management (Carter and Lorsch, 2004; McCabe and Nowak, 2008; Pettigrew and McNulty, 
1995; Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005). 
It is therefore down to the chairperson to set the tone and expectations of NED 
engagement and contribution (Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005), enabling NEDs to gain 
access to unfiltered direct information from different business units, employees, customers and 
other stakeholders. This allows NEDs to move away from a management-feeding process and 
be more effective in challenging and advising management. In this way, strategic tensions are 
likely to be surfaced in a more informed manner by providing NEDs with independent and 
firm-specific knowledge, useful in fully exposing and debating strategic tensions with the 
executive.  
4.1.2 Board–CEO engagement  
Board–CEO engagement is another important aspect for the chairperson to manage. As noted 
by several researchers, strong and engaged boards are an indicator of effective chairpersonship 
(e.g. Bailey and Peck, 2013; Leblanc and Gillies, 2005). Regarding board–CEO engagement, 
two aspects are salient in this study: i) the need to engage with the board in a timely manner 
regarding tension-generating topics; and ii) supportive engagement between the board and the 
CEO.  
4.1.2.1 Timely board engagement with strategic-tension-generating topics 
Non-executive board members can be frustrated and disengaged if they feel that they are being 
forced into taking a decision about a topic that is complex or even contentious. 
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 The chairperson of a large pharmaceutical company explained how he implemented a 
change in CEO–board interaction. Topics that were a source of tension were raised in good 
time with the board, allowing the board to understand and explore them with the CEO before 
problems materialised or major commitments were made. This in turn demanded greater 
engagement with the business challenges by board members.  
… I wanted to change the way the board and management interacted. So that meant 
that what I wanted from the CEO was that he would bring ideas to the board at an 
early stage of development, recognising that some of them would be half-baked and 
jumped, but giving the opportunity for the board to interact at an early stage and 
understand therefore what he was trying to achieve … That then placed a demand 
on the board to be much more engaged than they had been, so they understood 
more deeply the issues and challenges that the company had. So we evolved, both 
he raising subjects early on that concerned him; sometimes they were late because 
it was an emerging risk that suddenly hit us. (Chairperson 3) 
Another chairperson from a large tobacco company reported a similar practice in CEO–
board interaction. In this industry, the disruptive potential of e-cigarettes is a constant presence. 
Interaction allows the continual exploration of the company’s position in the face of this 
emergent threat. 
… off the top of my head, probably six or seven briefing papers over a year or two 
years, 18 months probably, and the board is fully engaged. But much more engaged 
from an education point of view: “Do you guys think we’re sort of going down the 
right track?” But, no, the board, no, very focused – important issue. (Chairperson 
4) 
Another chairperson explained his role in ensuring that the CEO and the board discuss 
tension-generating topics early and continuously. 
… my role here would be kind of to ensure that the board was completely informed 
and involved in these huge changes, right through, not just one-off, but steadily and 
continuously. (Chairperson 2) 
CEOs expressed similar views about CEO–board interaction, that is: in raising 
potentially tension-generating topics early with the board, so that engagement built slowly, 
directors became increasingly aware of the tensions and gained trust in the way the CEO was 
addressing them. If such tensions become salient and materialise as issues, the board is in a 
comfortable position to support the executive. 
… quite often we’ll produce for the board what looks like a board paper, what 
looks like an authorisation paper – but isn’t – and essentially it goes to the board 
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with a condition that there will be no decision taken, but it gives everybody a safe 
environment to explore how they feel about this option. Now, the deal is: you can’t 
criticise us, so the risk of that is that you could say, “Well, look, you’ve taken five 
ideas to get what you want. One said turn right, one said turn left, one said go 
forward. And you didn’t do any of them. Do you know what you’re doing?” Right 
that’s – which is where I think some people could lack. My view is the only way to 
really give the board a clear view of where the solution space is, is to be able to 
explore the solution space … the value of the board is at its maximum when the 
option is being initially considered, and it diminishes as it becomes more 
crystallised. And the reason for that is: because in a company this size you’d expect 
a lot of the details to be, you would not expect a useless proposal when you’ve got 
a company of this size. (CEO 7) 
Time and again, CEOs explained how ensuring boards’ early and continuous engagement 
with strategic topics allows confidence, awareness and understanding to grow, so that, when 
and if a decision is required, there is a history of interaction and thinking on the topic. This 
engagement process allows the CEO to understand each individual director’s views and 
preferences, and shape the proposals to accommodate these views, before submitting to the 
board for a decision. 
We’re always engaging with topics. So what we tend to do is: we will put a topic 
into the board to get a discussion round about it, to get their views and input, so as 
we essentially shape things before we get to the decision. Because what I don’t like 
is: I do not like forcing people to have to make a decision. Because I don’t want 
people to be uncomfortable … (CEO 9) 
Some CEOs described the relationship with the board as transparent and open (i.e. any 
issues can be debated), and indicated the importance of having opportunities to meet informally 
outside normal board meetings, which provide the right context for good debate and discussion 
of important issues. 
… we have a horribly transparent relationship; there are very few things that the 
board doesn’t know. We deliberately have two mechanisms of the board which 
work extremely well. So the dinner, the board dinner, which very often will be me 
on my own with the non-executives, we’re entirely free-flowing and strategic: 
What’s happening? What do we think about the environment? What do we think 
other companies are, so where are the big scary issues? So they’ll be regularly, 
and very often there will be over a period of two or three years, the same subject 
might be covered in 70% of those meetings, not super detail. (CEO 7) 
Chairpersons and CEOs both indicated that successful board–CEO engagement needs to 
be based on strategic topics – threats and opportunities – in a climate of openness and 
transparency that allows difficult issues to be discussed. This is often facilitated by means of 
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informal dinners and engagement outside the traditional, formal and minuted board meetings. 
Engagement is depicted as an ongoing process in which strategic topics are raised early (and 
sometimes stay on the agenda for years) so that the views of individual board members are 
heard before the CEO makes too strong a commitment to a course of action. This allows 
directors to gain trust about how strategic tensions are being addressed and gives them a 
continuous feed about how executive thinking is evolving.  
4.1.2.1 Supportive board–CEO engagement   
Ongoing board engagement regarding strategic business challenges allows continuous 
alignment to be built between the board and the CEO. Such alignment ensures there are no 
surprises for the board when strategic challenges require action. Because the board has been 
continuously engaged with the topics, and a shared understanding of the issues has been built 
up gradually, trust has developed and the board more readily engages with the necessary 
decisions in a supportive manner. CEOs in this study all agree that, when engagement with 
strategic topics happens openly and progressively in the manner described above, the board is 
more likely to show support for decisions when they become due. 
… it’s about taking them on board, it’s about involving them, it’s making them feel 
they’re part of the decision-making. It’s about – and this is where boards in total, 
i.e. non-execs and executives, if they work together, can be very unified and very 
strong and all speaking off the same song sheet. (CEO 11) 
Two further CEOs explained how they felt total unity and alignment between the board 
and the executives when the time came to make difficult decisions about ongoing strategic 
tensions. 
… in the world of trying to deal with a myriad of complex issues and stakeholders 
with the board 100% behind you, I knew I could rely on them. You couldn’t get a 
cigarette paper between the executive and the board, so as we went to the outside 
world we were unanimous. (CEO 2) 
… they trusted what we were saying … that’s where a board moves, in my humble 
opinion, from being one which is construed as an unnatural work team by the 
essence of what governance says: it’s where you want them then to coalesce, when 
you have a problem, to be a natural work team … it’s really important the board 
takes that same approach, which says: so you’ve got to have unity; which says: we 
were supportive of the executive doing this, the whole board was supportive of it, 
because quite often we get “where was the board?” and you say the board was 
absolutely 100% behind us. (CEO 10) 
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When engagement happens in this way, it reduces the time needed to respond to strategic 
issues that require immediate action.  
… it was a conversation with my executive colleagues, and obviously the board 
were heavily involved in this. They were, obviously, they could see what was 
happening. We were keeping them very informed on it. [The board was] interested 
in we were taking action, the necessary action, as fast as we could, and then it was 
about reporting back to them the progress that we were making. (CEO 1) 
Chairpersons have overall responsibility for ensuring adequate level and quality of 
engagement between the board and the CEO. It is for the chairperson to set expectations about 
engagement and how the board is to interact with the CEO. Obviously, engagement is a two-
way process and the CEO needs to play his or her part in keeping the board informed and 
engaged. In addition to setting the tone for board–CEO engagement, the chairperson has the 
additional responsibility of determining and organising the board agenda and working in such 
a manner that quality of engagement is achieved and strategic tensions are discussed 
appropriately. This is discussed next.  
4.1.2.3 Organising the board agenda and working for engagement 
Chairpersons have a lot of options available to them in shaping board agendas and ensuring 
appropriate board engagement with tension-generating topics. Setting the board agenda, and 
avoiding CEO domination of this process, has been consistently cited in research as an 
important chairperson responsibility (Bailey and Peck, 2013; McNulty et al., 2011; Pettigrew 
and McNulty, 1995; Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005). In this study, the chairperson of a 
large tobacco company explained how the threat of e-cigarettes as a substitute for the 
company’s product is a recurring issue on the board agenda.  
E-cigarettes exactly the same [i.e. regular item on the board agenda]. We’re very 
conscious that it could be very disruptive, or people talk about it as the Kodak 
moment potentially for tobacco. We don’t think so now, but we are alert to it and 
we think that we have enough rigour into the process to work out at what point it 
flips that we can be genuinely fast followers. (Chairperson 5) 
Another chairperson was decisive when asked about his role in dealing with strategic 
tensions. In a business facing technology disruption, which requires a transition to a new 
business model based on digital technology, the chairperson highlighted his role in ensuring 
that the tensions between legacy business and new business get onto the board agenda and are 
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challenged vigorously.  
My one job which I can do as a chairman is get these issues on the table: like the 
legacy issue, it’s really useful. I’ve got a good board who care, they’re engaged, 
they challenge, but it’s not this niggling kind of challenge that they teach people 
on strategy courses: some nonsense, babbling on like this. I just want to say, “Come 
on, give me something substantive. Let’s get into the business. Don’t sit there and 
try to be cute by asking piddling questions.” (Chairperson 2) 
Chairpersons respond to strategic tensions by getting them onto the board agenda and 
ensuring robust discussions that lead to a continuous common understanding of the tensions 
and the company’s strategic direction. This means board members confront the tensions on an 
ongoing basis and continuously monitor and calibrate executive thinking and strategic 
proposals.  
How the board functions, however, may need re-evaluating as circumstances change. 
One chairperson explained how he increased the number of meetings as well as the level of 
information brought before the board during the 2008–2009 financial crisis: 
Our normal board cycle, they meet every year and, I forget, it was 2008, 2009, we 
had 30 meetings one year and just about the same the next year. And that had two 
effects. One is: it denied the opportunity of saying, “Well, you, you’ve moved into 
a place where I wouldn’t be happy with”, but, secondly, it actually had the opposite 
effect, is they felt that they could, because it wasn’t just, there was, “Here’s the 
latest”, it was “Here’s the problem: what, how are we going to solve it?” They 
were deeply involved, and I absolutely reached out to each and every one of them 
to do that. And some were better than others at coping with that, but they, no one 
could say there weren’t given a chance to say their bit … (Chairperson 9) 
Chairpersons have freedom of choice in organising board work and the frequency of 
board meetings, and also in defining priority areas. It is also up to the chairperson to make 
changes to the board’s function that reflect changes in business circumstances. 
Chairpersons are also free to decide when special subcommittees are required in order to 
address non-programmed issues, as well as deciding who sits on committees and 
subcommittees. Since Cadbury (1992), audit, remuneration and nomination committees have 
been progressively adopted and are now established in the vast majority of FTSE publicly listed 
companies. Such committees, it is argued, constitute strategic tools to increase external 
legitimacy and ensure specialised monitoring and control of executive action (Harrison, 1987). 
Other studies have shown that NEDs working simultaneously in remuneration and audit 
committees might find it hard to reconcile a strategy and monitoring function (Spira and 
Bender, 2004). Less discussed in the literature is the impact of board committees and 
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subcommittees on information flows and overall NED engagement. In this study, chairpersons 
see committee work as necessary for addressing particular emerging topics of concern, but they 
also see committees and subcommittees as dangerous, as they can exclude some board 
members from important decisions, and place them at an informational disadvantage, thereby 
breaking down engagement. One chairperson explained: 
There’ll be a subcommittee. We always form them when there’s something big 
going on. For example, M&As: we will always run a subset of the board and I will 
always make sure that the skills I want are there. I tell those people they’ve got to 
just free up their diaries, and I will speak to them if they are having problems. And 
we do meetings late at night and we do meetings on Sundays. And so we’ve got that 
added flexibility: mandatory they attend. But the rest of the board is always 
informed when we’re having a subcommittee meeting and they are all invited to 
attend, but they’re not mandatory attendees. (Chairperson 5) 
This concern about the potential for committees and subcommittees to break information 
flows and engagement was expressed several times: 
… even though we have committees, everybody is free to join every committee and, 
yeah, as a matter of fact, everybody joins every committee. So they are not a full 
voting member but everybody is, and so there is not a two speed or two level of 
intelligence – particularly dangerous in my mind when it comes to audit that the 
audit people know so much more than the non-audit members. So all board 
members were continuously on the same level of information. (Chairperson 8) 
Such concerns echo Sharpe (2012), who warns that increased formalisation of the 
structure and complexity of boards may have unintended effects on the processing of 
information for good decision-making. To ensure that committees and subcommittees are not 
a constraining factor, some chairpersons choose to have an open policy where every board 
member is invited to sit on committees and subcommittees, thereby enabling an equal level of 
information and engagement of non-executives on important business topics.  
4.2 Managing board debate, dynamics and contribution on tension-generating topics 
This theme provides insight into the role of the chair in managing board debate, dynamics and 
contribution on difficult tension-generating topics. Engaged non-executives, with a variety of 
sources of information on which to rely and a board agenda that reflects the points of strategic 
tension being experienced by the firm, are prepared for productive and challenging board 
debate, but still require a chairperson capable of managing the meeting effectively so that the 
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tensions are actually addressed properly. Fundamental here is the chair role of creating a 
climate of open debate and trust where disagreement and tensions are voiced and worked 
through as a collective. An inclusive style of chairing that invites every board member to 
contribute his/her perspective is key. The chair acts as an integrator of differences about the 
strategic tensions by regularly summarising and concluding, and by putting back to the board 
questions that have been left unanswered as well as points of convergence.  
4.2.1 The role of the chair in managing board debate, dynamics and contribution  
The chairperson is the key individual managing board dynamics and contributions, thereby 
assuming a pivotal role in maintaining a climate of trust and openness, ensuring that tensions 
are fully confronted without the board losing its unity. 
Chairpersons interviewed emphasised their role in harnessing board members’ expertise 
and experience and allowing different perspectives to be debated freely inside the boardroom. 
One aspect of a chairperson’s role is to be an integrator by summarising and concluding on 
board members’ differing perspectives. The ability to conduct effective board meetings by 
means of open discussion and debate has been noted as a critical feature of a chairperson’s role, 
and one that has a decisive impact on board effectiveness (Bailey and Peck, 2013; Garratt, 
1999; McNulty et al., 2011; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005). 
… when you get to chairman level, you need to do a lot more of: right – this is the 
issue; what do people think? And let the debate go, maybe direct the debate a little 
bit, pull people in, but try and let the debate happen. And then conclude and 
summarise and let the decision be a board decision rather than a chairman 
decision. (Chairperson 5) 
The importance of good-quality debate that builds on board members’ different 
experience and skills is perceived by chairpersons to be important, particularly with regard to 
difficult strategic items that are by their nature contentious. The chairperson’s task is to ensure 
that board members do collide and have constructive conflict, but also to summarise and 
facilitate the integration of different views. The role of the chairperson is to expose tension 
points rather than avoid them, promoting open debate and healthy levels of cognitive conflict. 
One chairperson explained his view: 
… these are the situations where there’s lots of issues and lots of judgements to be 
made. And a good board should be one that can debate those issues openly and 
can manage argument successfully. The job of the chairman is making sure that 
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issues come on the table and people do collide. Now it, you would love to think the 
board will be as one, there will be no conflict, but actually there are issues – discuss 
them, otherwise you will make a wrong judgement. But the executive team need 
that supportive guidance, and that doesn’t just mean saying yes. (Chairperson 1) 
Some CEOs expressed agreement on this point:  
Now, some boards, I think, either don’t want to talk about things which are not real 
and some executives don’t want to talk about scary stuff that could be very 
dangerous. You need to get rid of both of those aspects and those discussions have 
to happen. (CEO 7) 
In line with previous findings, it is up to the chairperson to act as a “conductor”, manage 
dissent, and work towards a common consensual view, setting the tone on governance matters 
(Leblanc, 2004). Such a key requirement requires the role incumbent to be acutely aware of 
the board climate, sensing changes in mood, and understanding changing dynamics (Kakabadse 
et al., 2001). 
Time and again, chairpersons interviewed emphasised the need for tension-generating 
topics to be fully discussed while ensuring that boardroom conflict remains constructive. It is 
up to the chairperson to ensure that all non-executives have their say in order to maximise the 
knowledge and skills of all the board, to bring in different perspectives, and to ensure collective 
engagement and accountability.  
It doesn’t mean that you should never have disagreement in the boardroom, no, but 
you should be careful: you should dose it because it can become a vote of non-
confidence vis-à-vis an individual. The challenge for a chairman has to make sure 
that touchy items become a topic and not an item from the CEO. On the next board 
meeting we have two what I call topics, and everybody can there say draw a line 
or raise a flag because it’s a topic. It’s different versus if the CEO would say, “This 
is what I want to do”, because then you have to say no to the CEO or yes to the 
CEO. But here it’s brought as to “this is a topic” and everybody just, you have a 
guided discussion … During the board meetings you make sure as a chairman that 
everybody has his/her point of view because you have different characters. You 
have some people that are very talkative. There are some people they are just 
saying nothing, but once they say something it’s dot on. But try to make sure that 
at the end of an important discussion that you go round the table and ask each 
member their view, so they can’t hide by saying nothing. (Chairperson 8) 
Boards that are unable to cultivate open debate or challenge regarding tension-generating 
topics are seen by interviewees as dysfunctional and unable to cope with decisions about 
strategic tensions when they become due. One chairperson, new to the firm, explained how, 
during a board dinner, he questioned executives openly and challenged their answers, which 
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came as a shock as this had not been a practice of the previous incumbent. In fact, this firm had 
severe financial and competition problems and ended up bankrupt despite the chairperson’s 
efforts. 
And, indeed, when we went to the management in the US for the first time as a 
board, and I did a board dinner the night before and I chaired the conversation 
then. I went round and questioned every executive from the US management team 
in front of everyone else. That had never happened before. Apparently, they were 
quite taken aback by that: the process and the detail of the questions. And having 
the pushback on the answers. (Chairperson 7) 
One highly experienced chairperson made the case for open and frequent boardroom 
debate and challenge on important strategic issues, as well as the chairperson’s role in setting 
the tone for the discussions: 
… the board that is incapable of having debate or, if it’s a very frequent thing, 
you’ll find that lots of boards don’t want, and the chairman will intervene when 
people start arguing and they’ll close it out, take it outside the meeting. But that 
board is going to be tested when you get into this moment of challenges and, 
because it’s not capable of facing into the issues, will fail. No, but the point is to 
have that debate. If you have argument in a board, you have to have security in the 
board, security meaning people; there’s embedded trust and respect, and “I think 
your contribution is worthwhile; you think my contribution’s worthwhile”, so we’ll 
listen to each other, express our views clearly, listen clearly and not think this is 
somehow a career-threatening, life-threatening event to have a difference of view. 
(Chairperson 1) 
When boards are able to discuss strategic issues freely, and constructive challenge is part 
of the board’s culture, the company benefits from different perspectives, which make for a 
better-informed strategy by avoiding the dominance of one particular view.  
One chairperson described a situation in which the contribution of all members was 
important in reaching a consensus about the company’s competitive advantage in a situation of 
restructuring and technology disruption. He described how the CEO’s vision was to move the 
business entirely into the digital space, whereas the contribution of other board members 
provided a counterpoint, favouring the retention of a physical presence in stores. 
The CEO’s vision would probably in its more extreme be initially through a 
storeless society with massive online booking without an airplane and maybe even 
without a product. Really the magic intermediate. And [executive A] would then 
say, “Hey, but if you don’t have a product in this kind of industry, you’re not going 
to have anything. You need product.” And that brought in the focus of product. The 
CFO brought in the element of finance in terms of, “Hey, but your airline isn’t all 
that bad. It eats a lot of capital, but at the same time if we are moving into a sale 
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and leaseback, it really can bring some capital in there.” So they’re, those are 
examples where you have a discussion. (Chairperson 8) 
In contrast, one CEO (who viewed his chairperson as ineffective) explained how he feels 
boards are unprepared to deal with major tensions where solutions are not obvious and trade-
offs are required. Lack of time to reflect on tensions and a tendency for boards to prefer quick 
solutions were described as impeding boards’ contribution to difficult strategic tensions. In 
such boards, he asserted, loud voices and personality often drive decisions.  
Boards tend to like to find solutions to problems. Where they struggle is where 
there is no solution to be found. And where you, where you’ve got to make a trade-
off and your personal trade-off is driven by your value set, and my personal trade-
off is driven by my value set, and somebody’s got to make a decision in that. Those 
are difficult and they simply don’t have the time to really reflect on the trade-offs, 
the different perspectives, and quite often, too often, the decision is influenced by 
personality and loud speaking. People who shout and are passionate about it. 
(CEO 2) 
He continued by describing the boardroom environment during board meetings:  
Board meetings weren’t as challenging as they might be. We weren’t getting the 
benefit of the non-execs’ experience. They weren’t coming forward with, “Have 
you thought about doing this?” “Perhaps if we did that?” or “I’ve been listening 
to a stakeholder and they think a little bit more of this, a little bit less of that” type 
stuff. So it was quite a passive board. It really didn’t engender any real dialogue 
in collective problem solving. (CEO 2) 
The role of the chair in fostering engagement and debate around strategic tensions is 
intimately linked to the incumbent’s inclination regarding the desirable degree of board 
involvement in strategy development. The implications of this are discussed in the next section. 
4.3 Implications of the degree of board involvement in strategy development 
Among the factors determining the degree of board involvement in strategy, and which 
also emerge in this study, are: the extent to which the chairperson actually wants the board 
involved in strategy (O’Neal and Thomas, 1995); board meeting agendas; the processes and 
conduct of meetings; and the role of away-days or informal dialogue between the board and 
the executives (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999). Previous literature has portrayed board 
involvement in strategy as a passive–active continuum (e.g. Demb and Neubauer, 1992; 
Hendry, Kiel and Nicholson, 2010; Zahra, 1990). Scholars advancing the idea of this 
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continuum have found that UK boards play an active role in strategy, challenging managerial 
perspectives, especially in times of crisis or poor performance (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; 
Stiles and Taylor, 1996, 2001; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001), and chairpersons’ accounts 
in the present study suggest this is the case. Insofar as directors draw on their knowledge, 
experience and skills to influence management and shape strategy, they assume the role of 
resource providers (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999). However, we challenge this idea of the 
passive–active continuum, in that it “assumes linearity in the strategy process, but strategic 
decisions often evolve through complex, non-linear and fragmented processes” (Hendry, Kiel 
and Nicholson, 2010:35). Those chairperson accounts in this study that indicate that board 
meetings require the board to adopt an active and challenging position with regard to tension-
generating topics and management proposals imply that, in fact, strategy more resembles a 
highly contextual, interactive and complex practice where active and passive behaviours co-
exist (Carter and Lorsch, 2004). Boards participate in strategy by continuously interacting with 
management and other stakeholders (Jensen and Zajac, 2004; Useem and Zelleke, 2006). 
Recent research on “strategy as practice” has found that boards focus more on 
“interactive strategising” (as opposed to procedural strategising) involving “direct face-to-face 
interaction between senior management and other organisational actors in order to influence 
the development and execution of strategy” (Hendry, Kiel and Nicholson, 2010:37). Such 
strategising practice is seen as an “interpretative practice” which enables “top managers to 
argue for their own interpretations of strategy” relying on “social exchanges in which 
individuals and groups communicate, persuade, negotiate (and re-negotiate), continuously 
building shared frameworks of meaning about strategy in order to influence each other’s 
behaviors” (Hendry, Kiel and Nicholson, 2010:37). Importantly, such interactive strategising 
is likely to be used when the board’s strategic stance favours a change in strategic direction, 
typically when the firm finds itself in an environment characterised by complexity and resource 
scarcity. The chairperson’s chosen type of engagement and debate critically determines the 
degree of board involvement and influence over the firm’s strategy.  
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented evidence of the discretionary choices the chair possesses in looking 
to harness the effectiveness of the board in order to deal with strategic tensions. Such choices 
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primarily revolve around board engagement and practices of debate. Skilful use of such 
practices can be a means of handling difficult tension-generating challenges effectively and in 
a systematic way. These practices include setting and developing engagement policy and 
practice such that non-executive directors (NEDs) engage with the business by talking to 
people at different levels within the company, and by visiting operations and attending specific 
events. This offers NEDs unfiltered information and insight about the firm, impossible to obtain 
merely sitting around the boardroom table. It also means that board–CEO engagement is 
characterised by trust and members are comfortable with raising and discussing difficult issues. 
Early engagement with tension-generating topics allows NEDs to track management thinking 
and provide input before too much commitment has been made by the executive. This avoids 
frustration on either side, and allows more time for reflection on potentially contentious issues, 
leading to a much more supportive form of engagement between the board and the executive. 
Another important chairperson practice is mobilising the whole board to engage in 
committee work: every NED might therefore sit on a committee, even though he or she may 
not be a voting member of the board. In this way, all board members can maintain the same 
level of information. Finally, relevant strategic tensions and challenges need to be addressed 
proactively. A high-performing chair identifies (via NEDs and the executive) strategic tensions 
and ensures the board agenda reflects them. But encouraging engagement requires of the chair 
strong skills in conducting board meetings. Evidence suggests that high-performing chairs have 
an inclusive style, drawing all members into the discussion and ensuring that tensions are fully 
confronted and illuminated from multiple perspectives. The chair also emerges as an integrator 
of tensions by regularly summarising the different perspectives and building a shared 
understanding among board members, thereby maintaining board unity. 
These findings challenge those conceptions that see board involvement in strategy as 
belonging to a passive–active continuum; instead, they suggest that a high-performing chair 
creates engaged and informed boards capable of being meaningfully involved in scrutinising 
and developing the firm’s strategy. 
Most chairs assume their position without any prior training or understanding of what 
being a chairperson really means. They are supposed to “just know” how to lead the board. 
This study suggests that leading the board requires skills and preparation especially in the area 
of managing engagement and practice debate, which are the most critical in ensuring boards 
discharge their duties appropriately. This study therefore proposes that regulators in the UK 
and elsewhere provide more guidance and examples of best practice for chairs as regards how 
to promote adequate levels of engagement and debate around the right topics – i.e. those that 
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involve strategic tensions. To monitor and/or benchmark such practices, it is proposed that 
levels of engagement and debate might be voluntarily disclosed by boards, along with 
initiatives that have been taken to strengthen these practices, such as chair development, NED 
visits to operations, NED-only meetings, and so on.  
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